Preface

When people talk about “the grid,” they picture wires and poles. In reality it’s a tightly coupled machine made of giant power plants, high-voltage lines, control centers, software, telecom links, and a few thousand irreplaceable large power transformers (LPTs). Those transformers are the grid’s beating heart—and they’re scarce. A 2024 National Infrastructure Advisory Council draft found new large units “have lead times ranging from 80 to 210 weeks,” i.e., roughly 1.5 to 4 years. That’s not a typo. If many failed at once, you wouldn’t just wait days for lights—you could be waiting seasons or years for the backbone to be rebuilt. CISA

EMP, Cyber Attacks, and Power Grid Fragility

The nightmare scenario starts with an electromagnetic pulse (EMP)—from a high-altitude nuclear detonation or a powerful non-nuclear device—followed by coordinated cyber and physical attacks. The EMP Commission warned years ago that “EMP is one of a small number of threats that can hold our society at risk of catastrophic consequences,” because it can damage electronics and control systems across an entire continent in milliseconds. empcommission.org

At the same time, adversaries exploit pre-positioned access in U.S. networks. U.S. agencies say China-linked “Volt Typhoon” actors have burrowed into critical infrastructure using “living off the land” techniques, enabling “long-term undiscovered persistence.” Their explicit goal: to “pre-position” for “disruptive or destructive cyber activity” against power, water, communications and transportation in a crisis. That’s from joint advisories by CISA, FBI, NSA and partners. CISA+2CISA+2

This isn’t theoretical. In 2018 the U.S. government detailed how Russian government cyber actors “targeted” the U.S. energy sector and related industrial controls. In 2024, the FBI Director testified that Chinese actors had already used compromised routers to mask reconnaissance against “communications, energy, transportation, and water” networks. Federal Bureau of Investigation

What to Expect on the First Day

If a worst-case EMP cripples grid controls and simultaneously knocks telecom gear and vehicle electronics offline in large numbers, the effect is immediate: power grids fragment, control centers go dark, and blackstart teams can’t coordinate. Even without EMP, a severe cyber/physical campaign could cause cascading failures—something we’ve seen at smaller scale during extreme space-weather events. NOAA’s top “G5/Extreme” geomagnetic storm category is blunt: “some grid systems may experience complete collapse or blackouts. Transformers may experience damage.” NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center

As electricity dies, communication collapses by degrees. The FCC requires providers to offer 8-hour backup for customer equipment (with a 24-hour option), but home routers, optical network terminals and cell-site batteries typically don’t last long without refueling. Once local backup drains, your cable modem, VoIP phone, and many cell towers are simply dead.
Water is next. DHS found that 100% of assessed drinking-water plants and 97% of wastewater facilities depend on electric power; without backup generation they “lose operational capability by 100 percent.” Even with generators, many can run only about seven days without refueling. That’s the point where taps sputter, sewer lift stations back up, and boil-water notices begin—if you can even receive them. AMWA

Day 2 to Week 2: Supply Chains Seize

Grocery stores close or go cash-only; refrigeration fails; electronic point-of-sale terminals and ATMs are offline. Gas stations need power for pumps and payment—during Hurricane Ida, DOE observed widespread station closures or hours-long lines at the few sites running on generators. Multiply that across a region and resupply trucks can’t fuel, either. The Department of Energy’s Energy.gov

Natural gas isn’t a guaranteed lifeline. Pipelines rely on compressor stations—many driven by gas turbines, some by electric motors—plus electric valves and control/telecom systems. Grid failures can interrupt gas delivery; and in homes, most “gas” furnaces, water heaters, and stoves still need electricity for ignition, blowers, and controls. The tighter the gas-electric interdependence (FERC calls it out specifically), the more both sectors suffer in a prolonged outage. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Hospitals burn through diesel; data centers go quiet; municipal water generators need refueling convoys and safe roads. In a communications vacuum, rumors spread faster than verified instructions. History shows long blackouts correlate with spikes in opportunistic crime; during the 1977 New York City blackout, widespread looting and arson erupted within hours. Prepare for curfews, National Guard deployments, controlled access to fuel and food, and sheltering operations under FEMA’s National Response Framework. FEMA

Week 3 to Month 3: Going From Inconvenience to Survival

If an EMP or cascading grid failure destroyed a meaningful number of large transformers, restoration becomes a logistics war. DOE’s 2024 LPT resilience report underscores the problem: long procurement cycles, specialized steel, global supply constraints, and limited transport routes. There is no quick “order-and-install.” Meanwhile, operators try to blackstart islands of generation and knit them together—but even a single interconnection can take “multiple days to weeks” to fully restore under favorable conditions. Now imagine doing that with damaged equipment, contested cyber terrain, and broken comms. The Department of Energy’s Energy.gov+1

Water and wastewater systems—lifelines for hygiene and fire protection—will ration service as diesel and treatment chemicals run short. DHS’s own sector analysis warns of “cascading impacts” from water loss across Energy, Healthcare, Communications, IT, and Emergency Services—a polite way of saying public health emergencies follow utility failures. AMWA

Financial systems degrade from “interruption” to paralysis. Electronic settlement, card networks, and even some bank branches can operate only with power and connectivity. Federal and state emergency authorities can invoke extraordinary powers—curfews, movement restrictions, fuel allocations—to stabilize supply and prevent unrest (governors have broad emergency energy powers; “martial law” is legally complex and rare, but National Guard deployments and strict civil orders are on the table). National Governors Association+1

Critical Points of Failure

What fails in a grim EMP and cyber scenario? Anything that needs continuous electricity or delicate electronics: modern cars (some), medical devices without power, refrigeration, most internet, cellular networks, cable/streaming TV, and much radio except stations with hardened studios and ample fuel. Some battery radios could still receive AM/FM if transmitters survive on generators; HF/shortwave can also be affected by space weather and propagation conditions. NOAA notes severe space weather can cause HF radio blackouts and navigation disruptions even without an EMP. NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center

Water and sewer service will degrade unevenly depending on backup fuel and gravity-fed storage, but DHS’s data-driven warning is stark: without power, treatment plants “lose operational capability by 100 percent.” That means scarce potable water, rising disease risk, and fire suppression challenges. AMWA

Credible Voices…Not Just Doomsday Rhetoric

If all of this sounds dire, it’s because sober institutions have said so for years:

• “EMP is one of a small number of threats that can hold our society at risk of catastrophic consequences.” — EMP Commission Chairman Dr. William R. Graham. empcommission.org

• NOAA’s “G5/Extreme” geomagnetic scale warns that some grid systems may “experience complete collapse or blackouts,” with potential transformer damage. NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center

• U.S. cyber authorities say PRC-linked actors are already pre-positioned in U.S. critical infrastructure for “disruptive or destructive” effects in a crisis. CISA

• ERCOT (Texas grid operator) states full system restoration after a blackout can take “multiple days to weeks.” ERCOT

• NIAC reports LPT lead times of 80–210 weeks—years, not months. CISA

What This Means For the Average Family

Within hours: ATMs and card readers fail; your ISP and many cell towers follow as batteries drain; grocery cold cases warm; gas pumps stop. Within days: water pressure drops, boil-water advisories arrive (if you can receive them), and sewer overflows begin; neighborhood policing shifts to checkpoints and curfews; hospitals ration care by generator fuel. Within weeks: without major outside aid, urban food and water scarcity produce unrest; rural areas face isolation and medical shortages. Restoration is not linear; pockets of power return long before entire regions are stable, and any replacement of damaged LPTs proceeds on long global supply lines. The Department of Energy’s Energy.gov+2AMWA+2

On A Slightly Positive Note

Even in a bleak model, some communications survive (battery radios, well-provisioned stations, satcom that isn’t fried and has power). Authorities will prioritize water, hospitals, and fuel—under the National Response Framework—long before normal retail comes back. Plan accordingly: water first, then sanitation, shelf-stable calories, meds, light/heat, cash for early days, and trusted radio sources for instructions. None of this is sensationalism; it’s the prudent reading of how our lifelines actually work, straight from the agencies and operators charged with keeping them alive. FEMA