Preface

A nuclear strike isn’t a movie-plot fantasy; the Pentagon treats it as a real, modern risk. In its Nuclear Posture Review, DoD warns that “by the 2030s the United States will, for the first time in its history, face two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors and potential adversaries,” explicitly naming Russia and China and noting “new stresses on stability.” U.S. Department of War The Department’s 2024 Nuclear Employment Strategy goes further: “Russia poses an acute threat” with a large, modern arsenal, while the PRC has “embarked on an ambitious expansion” of its nuclear forces—trends that “complicate deterrence challenges around the globe.” U.S. Department of War In short: U.S. defense planning assumes the possibility of nuclear deployment is a remote but credible, and that families, cities, and critical infrastructure would be affected when all other deterrence fail. U.S. Department of War

Nuclear Arsenal

Nine states have nuclear weapons, but the United States’ primary adversaries are Russia, China, and North Korea. As of early 2025, SIPRI estimates ~12,241 nuclear warheads worldwide, ~9,614 of which are in military stockpiles; ~2,100 are kept on high operational alert—mostly U.S. and Russian. China’s arsenal is growing fastest (≈600 warheads, and rising). SIPRI+2SIPRI+2

Yields span from “tactical” to city-killing strategic. On U.S. submarines, common warheads include the W76 (~90 kt) and W88 (~455 kt). Federation of American Scientists+2Wikipedia+2 Russia’s modern RS-24 Yars ICBM carries multiple warheads often assessed in the 200–300 kt range. China still fields the silo-based DF-5 family, including a Pentagon-cited variant with a “multi-megaton” payload—orders of magnitude above the ~15 kt that destroyed Hiroshima. Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance+1

Impact Zones

Damage is not a neat circle. FEMA/HHS describe three overlapping blast zones after a detonation: Severe Damage (SDZ), Moderate Damage (MDZ), and Light Damage (LDZ). In the SDZ, reinforced buildings collapse, fires are ubiquitous, and survival without immediate specialized rescue is unlikely. The MDZ has heavy structural damage, massive glass injuries, fires, and blocked roadways; LDZ still brings widespread window failure and injuries. For larger yields, “a factor-of-ten increase in yield roughly doubles” these distances. That’s the cube-root scaling of blast at work. Remm

Thermal pulses ignite clothing and structures and cause deep burns far beyond the core blast rings; prompt radiation adds an inner ring of lethal exposures, while downwind fallout from surface bursts can deposit life-threatening doses dozens of miles away. HHS’s Radiation Emergency Medical Management (REMM) maps combine these hazards and show how third-degree burn risk and acute radiation syndrome (ARS) overlap with SDZ/MDZ/LDZ for 10-100 kt detonations. Remm

Casualties scale brutally with yield and urban density. A National Academies scenario review cites indicative fatalities of ~110,000 for a 100-kt detonation and ~394,000 for 475-kt—before accounting for fires, fallout, and system collapse. (Change the height of burst or weather and the numbers shift.) NCBI Princeton’s “Plan A” simulation of a U.S.-Russia war projects ~90 million casualties in hours; it is sobering not because it’s precise but because it demonstrates how quickly modern arsenals overwhelm medical capacity and governance.

“Get inside, stay inside, stay tuned,” FEMA says—because dense shielding in the first 12–24 hours is the single biggest lifesaver against fallout. Decal

Forecasted Recovery Timeline

In a multi-strike + HEMP scenario, the Energy and Communications lifelines collapse first, and they drag the others down (Food/Hydration/Shelter; Water/Wastewater; Health/Medical; Transportation; Finance). FEMA’s Community Lifelines doctrine explicitly maps these interdependencies: when grid power and comms fail, fuel pumps, clinics, 911, banking terminals, and supply chains fail with them. FEMA+1

Electric grid. Large power transformers (LPTs)—the backbone of transmission—are custom, massive, and scarce. Federal analyses and industry assessments now put lead times at ~80–210 weeks (≈1.5–4 years) even in peacetime; that’s before you add war-zone access, radiation, or destroyed factories. CISA+1 DOE’s 2024 LPT resilience report, NERC reliability assessments, and FERC’s outlook all flag these supply-chain bottlenecks as an ongoing national risk. The Department of Energy’s Energy.gov+2NERC+2 The 2017 Congressional EMP Commission warned starkly that “no infrastructure other than electric power has the potential for nearly complete collapse from EMP”—a short quote that lands harder after you understand transformer realities. EMPCommission.org

Water and wastewater. Without grid power, pumps lose pressure and utilities issue (or would need to issue) boil-water advisories; in a nuclear strike, boil water may not be possible or safe. EPA and FEMA planning assume rapid loss of potable water and sanitation without emergency power. US EPA+1

Fuel and natural gas. Gas stations need electricity to pump; refineries and pipelines need power and controls. Many gas transmission compressors are gas-driven, but a significant fraction are electric—and outages at those stations cascade into fuel shortages. DOE/INGAA and peer-reviewed work show electric-dependent compressor outages can sharply reduce gas deliverability, with grid-gas “co-dependency” creating vicious loops (no power → less gas → less power). netl.doe.gov+2INGAA+2

Hospitals and EMS. The same blast/fallout rings that strip infrastructure also destroy care capacity. HHS/REMM emphasizes mass burn and ARS triage amid a scarcity of burn beds (the U.S. has far fewer than the cases a single large detonation would create). FEMA’s operational guidance anticipates that the directly impacted jurisdiction’s response is “overwhelmed,” requiring outside aid that may be delayed by contamination and debris. Remm+1

Communications. Local SREMP (near-burst) and broad HEMP can disable radios, switching, and backhaul; battery/hand-crank radios may still work outside the heavy damage zones, but within strike regions and under EMP, assume communications failure for days or longer. Remm

Cyber as a force multiplier. U.S. agencies warn that state actors have already pre-positioned in U.S. critical infrastructure. CISA, NSA, and FBI say the PRC-linked “Volt Typhoon” campaign compromised networks in communications, energy, transportation, and water—specifically to enable disruption during a crisis. CISA+2CISA+2 ODNI’s 2025 threat assessment likewise lists China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as the most consequential cyber threats to U.S. infrastructure. ODNI+1

Likely Targets: Defense, Infrastructure, Dense Populations

The Pentagon’s own employment guidance underscores counterforce (degrading the other side’s nuclear forces and command) rather than “countervalue” city-targeting. That same logic implies how an adversary would go after the U.S.: nuclear forces, command-and-control, and early-warning, then power-projection hubs and economic nodes, with population centers punished or coerced. U.S. Department of War

First-strike (counterforce & C2): U.S. ICBM fields (F.E. Warren WY/NE/CO; Malmstrom MT; Minot ND), bomber bases (B-52: Barksdale LA & Minot ND; B-2: Whiteman MO; B-21: Ellsworth SD), SSBN bases (Kings Bay, GA; Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, WA), STRATCOM HQ (Offutt AFB, NE), NORAD/NORTHCOM (Peterson SFB & Cheyenne Mountain, CO), and missile-defense nodes (e.g., Vandenberg SFB, CA). Ready.gov+4CDC+4FEMA+4

Second-strike (power projection & logistics): major ports and naval bases (e.g., Norfolk VA, San Diego CA), large air mobility hubs, key refineries and pipeline junctions, and grid chokepoints.

Third-strike (countervalue & coercion): largest metros and capitals to break governance and will.

Societal Behavior Collapse Under Extreme Pressure, Chaos, and Scarcity

Expect mass displacement, opportunistic and organized looting, and neighborhood self-defense in the vacuum before an organized response reach you. Governors can and do impose curfews and activate the National Guard; the President cannot casually “declare martial law,” and the Posse Comitatus Act restricts the military from domestic law enforcement absent statutory authority—but the Insurrection Act allows federal troops to suppress violence when civil authorities cannot. In extreme, prolonged breakdown, you should expect strict movement controls under declared emergencies. Every CRS Report+1

Societal Impact Timeline

Minutes–Hours: Mass casualties; fires; bridges and freeways blocked; cell networks collapse; first informal looting; no 911 in the blast metro. Shelter immediately against fallout for 12–24 hours minimum (“get inside, stay inside, stay tuned”). Decal

Day 1–3: Fallout remains lethal downwind; hospitals overwhelmed or offline; grocery stores, ATMs, and gas stations closed; boil-water advisories where water exists at all; no reliable communications in impact regions. US EPA

Week 1–4: Fuel distribution patchy; dialysis/insulin and critical-care mortality climbs; organized looting rises where law enforcement presence is thin; curfews likely. (FEMA’s “impacted jurisdiction” concept assumes your local system is still trying to reconstitute basic response capacity.) FEMA

Months 2–6: Regional shortages harden into famine and disease risks in worst-hit metros; ad-hoc settlement in host communities (a documented pattern in nuclear displacement studies). Some suburbs with intact infrastructure recover faster; urban cores remain unsafe. UNIDIR → Building a more secure world.

6–24 months: Portions of the grid return where transformers and lines can be replaced and crews can work safely; but LPT lead times (80–210 weeks) keep vast holes in the transmission network. Many hospitals and treatment centers in the strike rings don’t come back without federal rebuilds; water/wastewater systems remain the long pole. NERC+1

Five–Ten years: In a multi-city, multi-EMP scenario, full restoration of pre-war power, water, and comms to all metros is a 5–10 year proposition at best, mostly because (1) bespoke high-voltage equipment must be manufactured and transported, (2) contaminated urban sites demand massive remediation, and (3) skilled-labor and materials pipelines are globally constrained. That timeline aligns with federal and industry evidence on transformer supply chains—and that’s without continued conflict, sanctions, or domestic unrest. The Department of Energy’s Energy.gov+2NERC+2

What Does This Mean For Families On The Ground

It’s bleak. Expect no phones, no internet, no TV; even radio may be intermittent near strike zones or under HEMP. Expect no fuel unless you stored it, no water unless you can make it safe, and no help for 24–72 hours (or longer) if you are in or near the blast/fallout areas. The single best lifesaving move remains rapid sheltering in the deepest, cleanest space available for the first day (basement or interior), followed by timed evacuation when dose rates fall and routes are passable. FEMA/HHS guidance is unequivocal on this. Decal+1

If you want to visualize the physics for your specific location, NUKEMAP (by historian Alex Wellerstein) lets you select a city, yield, and height of burst, then see blast overpressure, thermal burns, and fallout plumes with prevailing winds. It’s not a prediction tool; it’s a way to confront scale and plan. Nuclear Secrecy

Likely U.S. Targets

If you’re near an ICBM field, bomber base, SLBM base, STRATCOM/NORAD, or a major port/air hub, you’re in the first two tiers of plausible targeting in a major war. That isn’t guesswork; it follows directly from U.S. and Russian/Chinese counterforce doctrine and from the public locations of U.S. nuclear forces and command centers. (STRATCOM at Offutt; NORAD at Peterson/ Cheyenne Mountain; SSBNs at Kings Bay and Kitsap; B-52s at Barksdale and Minot; B-2 at Whiteman; B-21 at Ellsworth; Minuteman fields in MT/ND/WY-NE-CO.) Ready.gov+5U.S. Department of War+5CDC+5

Difficult Numbers to Contemplate

• Yields to compare: Hiroshima ≈15 kt. Common U.S. SLBM warheads ≈90 kt and ≈455 kt; Russian and Chinese ICBM warheads often 200–300 kt, with some multi-megaton legacy/silo systems. Federation of American Scientists+3Wikipedia+3Federation of American Scientists+3

• Damage scaling: ~10× increase in yield ≈ ~2× increase in key damage distances (the cube-root rule). Remm

• Transformers: replacement 80–210 weeks even in peacetime. NERC

• Cyber threat now: U.S. agencies confirm pre-positioning inside U.S. critical infrastructure by PRC-linked actors for potential disruption “in the event of a major crisis.” CISA